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Natural	 disasters	 are	 increasing	 in	 frequency	 and	 intensity	 and	 have	 devastating	 impacts	 on	
individuals,	 both	 humanitarian	 and	 economic,	 particularly	 in	 developing	 countries.	
Microinsurance	is	seen	as	one	promising	instrument	of	disaster	risk	management,	however	the	




provider,	 requirements	 for	 prevention	 and	 combinations	 with	 credit.	 Furthermore,	 financial	

















areas,	 their	 economic	 dependence	 on	 agriculture	 and	 higher	 rates	 of	 population	 growth.	
Furthermore,	 the	 damage	 caused	 by	 disasters	 affects	 development	 processes	 and	 hinders	
poverty	reduction	efforts.	(IPCC	2012;	Ahsan	2014;	Surminski	&	Oramas-Dorta	2011)	
The	reduction	of	risk	exposure	and	vulnerability	as	well	as	the	creation	of	response	institutions	
are	 some	 forms	of	 disaster	prevention,	 and	more	broadly,	 of	 disaster	 risk	management.	Risk	











This	 paper	 investigates	 the	 impact	 of	 several	 determinants	 –	 including	 individual	 risk-taking	
propensity,	levels	of	trust,	exposure	to	risk	–	on	the	demand	for	microinsurance.	A	discrete	choice	
experiment	accompanied	by	a	survey	and	behavioural	games	were	conducted	in	rural	Cambodia.		








al.	 (2014),	 12	 determinants	 –	 economic,	 social,	 structural	 and	 personal	 factors	 –	 can	 be	
distinguished.	 These	 include,	 among	 others,	 the	 price	 of	 the	 product,	 wealth	 and	 income,	
individual	 levels	 of	 risk	 aversion	 and	 trust,	 the	 existence	 of	 other	 risk	 sharing	 networks	 and	
exposure	to	risk.	(Outreville	2013;	Eling	et	al.	2014;	Cole	et	al.	2013;	Giné	&	Yang	2009;	Giné	et	
al.	2008;	Cole	et	al.	2007;	Mahul	&	Skees	2007)	
Economic	 factors	 include	 the	 price	 of	 the	 insurance	 product	 as	 well	 as	 individual	 wealth	 or	
income.	As	 expected,	 empirical	 evidence	 shows	 a	 negative	 effect	 of	 price	 on	microinsurance	
demand.	Several	studies	show	a	higher	probability	of	 insurance	uptake	when	the	price	of	the	





Social	 and	 cultural	 factors	 include	 risk	 aversion,	 non-performance	 risk	 of	 the	 insurance,	 the	




2011;	Dercon	et	al.	2011;	Cole	et	al.	2013).	One	explanation	 for	 this	observation	may	be	 the	














quality	 of	 the	 product	 and	 the	 risk	 exposure	 of	 the	 individual.	 Empirical	 research	 shows	
ambiguous	effects	of	informal	risk-sharing	networks	on	insurance	demand	due	to	their	nature	of	
either	 substitutes	or	 complements	 for	 insurance	products	 (De	Bock	&	Gelade	2012;	Clarke	&	
Dercon	2009).	The	role	of	quality	is	considered	only	for	health	insurance,	where	a	positive	link	






charities	 etc.)	 may	 negatively	 impact	 the	 demand	 for	 insurance	 products	 (‘charity	 hazard’)	
(Raschky	et	al.	2012;	Kousky	et	al.	2013;	Albarran	&	Attanasio	2005).	


































product	 alternatives.	Discrete	 choice	 experiments	 emerged	 as	 an	 attractive	 tool	 in	 situations	
where	the	importance	of	specific	characteristics	of	a	good	or	service	cannot	be	observed	based	
on	 actual	 choices.	 Therefore,	 the	 strength	 of	 an	 individual’s	 preferences	 as	 well	 as	 their	





conducted	 on	 insurance	 demand	 against	 disaster	 risk.	 This	 method	 can	 provide	 important	
insights	 into	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 individual’s	 willingness	 to	 pay	 and	 the	 various	




















represents	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 baseline	 alternatives,	 in	 this	 case	 no	purchase	of	 any	 insurance	
product,	and	are	usually	not	specified.	Furthermore,	 individual	characteristics	are	 included	as	
interaction	 terms.	The	 regression	models	usually	 consist	of	a	dichotomous	or	polychotomous	
categorically	 dependent	 variable.	 Conditional	 logit,	 mixed	 logit/random	 parameter	 logit	 and	




for	 flood	 insurance	 in	developing	 countries	by	using	discrete	 choice	experiments.	Brouwer	&	
Akter	 (2010)	 analysed	 the	 demand	 for	 microinsurance	 of	 flood-affected	 households	 in	 rural	
Bangladesh.	A	range	of	insurance	schemes	were	offered	(including	property,	crops,	health	and	






strong	 preference	 for	 the	 status	 quo	 (no	 insurance)	 was	 found.	 Health	 insurance	 was	 the	
preferred	insurance	product,	provided	by	a	state-owned	company.	Finally,	Brouwer	et	al.	(2013)	
investigated	willingness	 to	pay	 for	 flood	 insurance	 in	Vietnam,	 finding	 a	 substantial	 demand.	






to	 be	 established,	 after	 which	 hypothetical	 alternatives	 were	 combined	 into	 choice	 sets.	 To	
ensure	 that	 respondents	 are	 able	 to	 consider	 all	 attributes	 for	 their	 choice,	 less	 than	 ten	
attributes	 are	 usually	 used	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 cognitive	 difficulties.	 The	 resulting	 choice	 sets	
consist	of	 two	or	more	alternatives	as	well	as	an	 ‘opt-out’	option,	 if	applicable.	Both	a	 full	or	
fractional	factorial	design	can	be	used.	Whilst	the	former	consists	of	all	possible	combinations	
between	the	various	attribute	levels,	the	latter	can	be	used	for	larger	choice	sets	as	long	as	the	
design	 is	 orthogonal	 (no	 correlation	 between	 estimated	 parameters)	 and	 balanced	 (equal	
numbers	of	each	attribute	level).	(Mangham	et	al.	2009;	Huber	&	Zwerina	1996)	
In	 the	 next	 step,	 several	 relevant	 attributes	 were	 selected,	 following	 previous	 research	 in	
developing	 countries,	 including	 cover	 sum,	premium	and	provider	 (Reynaud	&	Nguyen	2012;	
Brouwer	et	al.	2013;	Brouwer	&	Akter	2010;	Arshad	et	al.	2015).	However,	no	crop	 insurance	
existed	at	 the	time	of	 the	experiment	 in	Cambodia.	Therefore,	assumptions	 for	premium	and	
cover	sums	had	to	be	made	based	on	available	data	from	demand	studies	in	other	developing	
countries	as	well	as	economic	performance	indicators	in	Cambodia	(Brouwer	&	Akter	2010;	Akter	
2012;	 Cai	 et	 al.	 2013;	World	 Bank	 2014;	 Cambodia	 National	 Institute	 of	 Statistics	 2014).	 No	






or	 index-based	 insurance	schemes	as	well	as	for	a	combination	with	a	 loan	were	 investigated	







































the	 utility	 of	 one	 alternative	 (𝑗) 	given	 a	 certain	 choice	 set	 (𝑘) 	is	 assumed	 to	 comprise	 a	
	 	 10	
deterministic	 part	𝑉(𝑋'(|𝛽) 	and	 a	 random	 part	 𝜖,'( .	 With	 𝜖 	from	 a	 type	 I	 extreme	 value	
distribution,	the	individual	utility	for	an	alternative	(𝑗)	𝑈,'(	is	given	by:	
𝑈,'( = 𝑉 𝑋,'( 𝛽 +	𝜖,'(	
In	order	to	assess	average	individual	preferences,	a	condition	logit	model	is	used,	starting	with	a	
basic	model	of	each	alternative,	 consisting	of	an	additive	 function	of	 the	 six	attributes	and	a	
dummy	variable	representing	the	utility	of	the	‘opt-out’	option.	














Villages	 in	 the	 Thma	 Koul	 district	 in	 Battambang	 province	 were	 selected,	 comprised	 of	
households	both	affected	and	unaffected	by	severe	flooding	in	October	2013.	The	research	was	




















well	 as	 prevention	 and	 preparedness	 toward	 floods.	 The	 questionnaire	 was	 developed	 with	
orientation	on	similar	surveys	in	the	relevant	literature	(Ahsan	et	al.	2014;	Reynaud	&	Nguyen	














Cover	 0.082	(0.130)	 0.116	(0.134)	 0.184	(0.143)	
Condition	 for	 pay-out	 (Index-based	
insurance)	
0.115	(0.112)	 0.105	(0.118)	 0.237*	(0.134)	
Credit	(Combination	with	loan)	 0.184*	(0.105)	 0.187*	(0.110)	 0.537***	(0.175)	
Prevention	 (Insurance	 requires	 additional	
prevention	effort)	
-0.137	(0.105)	 -0.104	(0.110)	 -1.541***	(0.527)	
Provider	(Provincial	government)	 0.133	(0.146)	 0.193	(0.151)	 0.156	(0.162)	
Provider	(Private	company)	 0.172	(0.150)	 0.212	(0.156)	 0.264	(0.172)	
Provider	(Non-governmental	organisation)	 0.379**	(0.157)	 0.404**	(0.163)	 0.296	(0.182)	
Provider	(Village)	 0.106	(0.141)	 0.144	(0.147)	 0.147	(0.162)	
No	insurance	 -0.373**	(0.185)	 -1.179***	(0.370)	 -1.670**	(0.778)	
No	insurance	:	Affected	 	 0.659***	(0.184)	 2.128***	(0.407)	
No	insurance	:	Share	bet	in	risk	game	 	 -0.928**	(0.384)	 -1.624***	(0.543)	
No	insurance	:	Share	sent	in	trust	game	 	 1.988***	(0.384)	 1.957***	(0.550)	
No	insurance	:	Financial	literacy	 	 -0.466***	(0.069)	 -0.388***	(0.095)	
Premium	 :	 Total	 income	 per	 capita	 in	 US	
Dollars	(2013)	
	 	 0.216*	(0.114)	
Credit	 (Combination	with	 loan)	 :	Household	
without	credit	
	 	 -0.403*	(0.210)	
Prevention	 (Insurance	 requires	 effort)	 :	
Importance	of	prevention	
	 	 0.328***	(0.115)	
No	insurance	:	Ability	for	prevention	 	 	 0.244**	(0.103)	
No	insurance	:	Consequences	of	flood	 	 	 -0.730***	(0.108)	
No	insurance	:	Vulnerability	of	household	 	 	 0.119	(0.175)	
No	 insurance	 :	Received	money/goods	 from	
government	
	 	 0.737**	(0.288)	
No	 insurance	 :	Received	money/goods	 from	
charities	
	 	 0.211	(0.288)	
No	insurance	:	Agricultural	land	owned	in	ha	 	 	 0.159*	(0.086)	
No	insurance	:	Use	of	chemical	fertiliser	 	 	 1.021***	(0.320)	
Number	of	observations	 3,309	 3,219	 2,949	
Akaike	information	criterion	(AIC)	 1,955	 1,775	 1,351	
Adjusted	McFadden	R2	 0.025	 0.090	 0.253	
Standard	errors	in	parenthesis,	***	p	<	0.01,	**	p	<	0.05,	*	p	<	0.10.	
The	price	of	the	 insurance	significantly	and	negatively	 impacts	the	demand	for	the	product,	a	











effect	 is	 smaller	 for	 individuals	who	 evaluate	 prevention	 as	 important.	 However,	 for	 a	more	
detailed	 consideration	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 prevention	 on	 insurance	 demand,	 specific	 prevention	
projects	and	associated	costs	must	be	provided.	
In	 term	 of	 insurance	 providers,	 respondents	 show	 a	 preference	 for	 non-governmental	
organisations	over	the	national	government	(although	this	effect	becomes	insignificant	in	model	
3).	 When	 asked	 after	 the	 discrete	 choice	 experiment,	 respondents	 preferred	 the	
village/immediate	 community	 as	 provider,	 followed	 by	 the	 national	 government	 and	 non-
governmental	organisations.	Finally,	model	3	shows	significance	for	a	preference	towards	index-
based	schemes.	





























interpersonal	 trust	 within	 the	 community.	 In	 this	 case,	 trust	 towards	 other	members	 of	 the	
community	may	 reflect	 the	efficiency	of	 informal,	 community-based	 risk-sharing	 instruments,	
which	operate	as	substitutes	to	 insurance	products	(De	Bock	&	Gelade	2012;	Arnott	&	Stiglitz	
1991;	Brata	et	al.	2014).	Despite	the	fact	that	the	presence	of	trust	–	and	more	broadly,	social	
capital	–	does	not	automatically	 imply	 the	existence	of	any	 informal	 insurance,	 the	access	 to	
networks	 and	 social	 capital	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 informal	 instruments	 (Dercon	 2002;	
Morsink	2012).	 In	 this	context,	empirical	evidence	shows	a	 lower	 interest	 in	health	 insurance	
products	in	more	cohesive	communities	and	a	higher	trust	in	informal	instruments	(Jowett	2003).	
Individuals	with	previous	experience	of	natural	disasters	show	a	higher	preference	for	the	status	
quo	 and	 therefore	 less	 interest	 in	 insurance,	 although	 this	 effect	 is	 smaller	 for	 individuals	





explaining	 risk	 exposure	 is	 empirically	 difficult,	 the	 result	 indicates	 that	 the	 updating	 of	
information	 may	 be	 of	 particular	 importance.	 Previous	 disaster	 experience	 can	 provide	
information	 about	 existing	 coping	 strategies,	 including	 the	 stability	 of	 informal	 risk-sharing	
instruments	in	the	case	of	the	realisation	of	a	systemic	risk.	Moreover,	new	information	about	
the	 frequency	and	 severity	of	 floods	may	 lead	 to	a	 reassessment	of	 the	 individual	 flood	 risk.	























This	 paper	 investigated	 the	 impact	 of	 various	 determinants	 on	 the	 hypothetical	 demand	 for	
microinsurance	 in	 rural	 Cambodia.	 A	 discrete	 choice	 experiment	 is	 used	 in	 order	 to	 elicit	
individual	preferences	for	various	product	attributes	and	to	analyse	the	role	of	determinants,	
including	individual	risk-taking	propensity,	levels	of	trust	and	exposure	to	flood	risks.	
Overall,	 the	 study	 shows	a	preference	 for	 change	and	 therefore	an	 interest	 in	 the	presented	
microinsurance	 products,	 with	 a	 particular	 demand	 for	 insurance	 from	 more	 vulnerable	
individuals.	As	expected,	the	price	of	the	product	was	found	to	have	a	negative	effect	on	the	
demand	for	microinsurance,	although	the	effect	decreased	with	higher	incomes.	Furthermore,	a	
preference	 for	a	bundle	of	 insurance	with	credit	was	 found,	emphasising	 the	complementary	
nature	of	the	relationship	of	both	products.	Non-governmental	organisations	are	preferred	as	
providers	 over	 the	 national	 government	 and	 insurance	 products	 with	 additional	 prevention	
requirements	were	less	in	demand.		
Greater	 financial	 literacy	 and	 therefore	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 insurance	 product	
increases	the	demand	for	microinsurance.	A	negative	effect	of	risk	aversion	on	insurance	demand	
was	 found,	 a	 result	 that	 contrasts	with	 traditional	 insurance	 theory	 but	 aligns	with	 previous	
microinsurance	 research.	 One	 explanation	 for	 this	 observation	 may	 be	 the	 perception	 of	
insurance	instruments	as	risky	elements	in	themselves.	Surprisingly,	higher	individual	levels	of	
trust	 were	 found	 to	 have	 a	 significantly	 negative	 effect	 on	 the	 demand	 for	 microinsurance.	
Therefore	it	can	be	argued	that	interpersonal	trust	–	as	measured	by	the	investment	game	–	may	
be	a	proxy	for	individuals’	reliance	on	the	stability	and	efficiency	of	informal,	community-based	




future.	 Finally,	 this	 paper	 shows	empirical	 evidence	 for	 charity	 hazard	 –	 the	 crowding	out	 of	
market-based	insurance	products	by	the	provision	of	external	assistance	from	the	government	
or	non-governmental	organisations.	
These	 results	 contribute	 significant	 household	 level	 evidence	 to	 the	 current	 research	
investigating	the	determinants	of	microinsurance	demand,	using	a	unique	data	set	following	a	
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